In the space of one week, two maneuvers were carried out in the Lebanese arena simultaneously: the first American, the second Iranian, each aiming to counter and undermine the interests of the other side.
A few days ago, Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant US Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, concluded a visit to Lebanon where he met with political figures including Christian leaders, members of the March 14th Alliance, and President Michel Suleiman.
Simultaneously, the Iranian First Vice President Mohammed Reza Rahimi paid a visit to Beirut, where he met with leaders from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, along with the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Parliament and even President Michel Suleiman.
Following his meetings, Feltman said that it was necessary to reinforce the approach of freedom, democracy and internal solidarity in Lebanon, in order to face the challenges of the region. He added that it was necessary for Lebanon’s stance towards the situation in Syria to be clear, and sympathetic with the forces demanding freedom and sovereignty there.
As for the Iranian First Vice President, he called for action to strengthen President Mikati’s government, stressing that other counties should follow Lebanon’s distinguished model of democracy. Rahimi also added that he was against foreign intervention in Syria, and that the Syrian President must be allowed to reach a proper political solution.
An American maneuver and an Iranian counter-maneuver are being conducted in Lebanon, and the goal is to create a situation in Lebanon for dealing with the Syrian issue.
The Americans seek to groom Lebanon to apply pressure to the critical situation Syrian by all means possible to accelerate collapse of the regime, whilst the Iranians seek to strengthen the Mikati government and its allies in order to support the Syrian regime, so as to preserve it and decelerate the speed of its downfall.
It is such an explicit and clear ploy to exploit the Lebanese arena as part of a proxy conflict against others, and using the mediation of others.
It seems as if it is Lebanon’s inevitable fate to function as a “tool” for managing conflict and for settling international and regional disputes, using its soil.
It is my absolute conviction that pressure will mount upon Lebanon for it to play some role in the Syrian issue, and this will intensify gradually and simultaneously as the civil war escalates in Syria, and as we approach the moment of the regime’s departure.
Between America’s pressuring role to help overthrow the Syrian regime, and Iran’s counter-measures to promote the pro-Assad trend, the map of internal Lebanese divisions seems as dangerous as the 17-year Lebanese civil war.
The question here is: How will Lebanon maintain its cohesion under all this immense pressure, whilst it is only a few meters away from the furnace of the Syrian civil war?