The political reality of the region blatantly reveals intensive Iranian maneuvers, both internally and externally. These are either to protect itself globally, from the world’s concerns regarding its nuclear program, regionally from the Arab protests or revolutions, internally, ever since the Green Revolution, or indeed to protect its ally, Syria. Iran also seeks to ensure that it continues to reap benefits from its previous allies, the Shiites in Iraq and Lebanon, and the Sunnis of Hamas in Gaza and al-Qaeda remnants.
In this clear context, by referring to ancient and modern history, and by referring to the hostile Iranian and Syrian statements towards the region and the Arab Gulf, with Saudi Arabia at the forefront, statements and stances that have been intensifying at a rapid pace in recent times, no observer can rule out Iranian or Syrian interference in what has been happening in Bahrain, or in the east of Saudi Arabia in Awamiyya and Qatif.
Away from the complex security incidents which are now being settled in the courts, a general reading of the scene and its development can help us throw light on history, so we can benefit from what is happening today, and what might happen tomorrow.
The Shiite opposition in modern-day Saudi Arabia once expressed itself through the nationalist and Baathist currents and the labor movements in the 1950s and 1960s, but it became tainted with sectarianism in the 1980s through its support for the Islamic revolutionary forces in Iran. Some members of the Saudi Shiite political opposition adopted London as the headquarters of their activities, after extensive travels.
In 1993, a Saudi political decision was issued to bring the majority of Shiite opponents in exile in Iran, London and America, back to their homeland and families. A number of realistic demands Shiite were also achieved, and the Shiites became active in their communities, either through their media presence, social influence or public criticism (Abraham Alhtalana: The Saudi Shiites). However, other parties within this community opted to stick with Iran, and further distanced themselves from their homeland. By now they had adopted another path, namely the path of violence.
In 1987, bloody events took place during the Hajj, with Iranian organization and support, and the participation of some Gulf and Saudi residents affiliated to the Shia sect. In 1988, the “SADAF” oil company facilities were bombed in the eastern province. In 1989, another group blew up the Almaasam tunnel during the Hajj, which killed thousands of pilgrims. This violent trend increased and developed in the mid-nineties, when a Shiite group linked to Iran carried out the Khobar Towers’ bombing in 1996.
In the first decade of the new millennium, after the September 11th bombings in 2001, Iran retreated from its foreign policies and maneuvers, until America undertook campaigns against Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003. Overtly, it did not move a finger to detect the American threat which had become closer in both the East and the West, but Iran’s underground movements –as usual- had never ceased. Even during the era of the Arab Spring, Iran has harvested the new democratic Iraq and its leader, a member of the Shiite Islamic Dawa Party (the Shiite version of the Muslim Brotherhood) and head of the State of Law Coalition, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.
We are recalling this history in order to confirm some facts on the ground, and assess the Shiite opposition in Saudi Arabia at a time when from a political and national standpoint, they have achieved many gains. Here, Alhtalana can offer us a developmental comparison when he says: “Those coming to Qatif can see a difference between the living conditions of its residents in the 1980s and their prospects in 2008, in its districts and regions that are now far cleaner and more organized than many of the neighborhoods in the city of Jeddah, which suffers from chronic problems” (p.14). However, Qatif has instead witnessed violence, fuelled by Iranian passion and support, bringing the scourge of Iranian saboteurs and undermining national security.
Today, with the so-called “Arab Spring”, some are trying to elevate the slogans of “rights” and “rights activism” above all rational knowledge, opinions and freedom of thought, and beyond all sincere forms of accountability. Some are attempting to make these slogans dominant over all other interpretations, whilst hiding in the shadow of Shiite and Sunni currents and symbols.
Our assessment of Shiite violence in Saudi Arabia proves two things. Firstly, it proves that Iran is behind the violence directed against Saudi Arabia, under a Shia shadow. Secondly, similar events, past and present, have taken place in the Gulf, because it falls within the same framework. Such events include the attempt to assassinate Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah in Kuwait, the hijacking of a plane to Jabriya, as well as the recent attempts to interfere in Kuwait and spread violence in Bahrain.
Here I do not need to distinguish the noble, respected Shiite community, with its many factions in Qatif, Medina and Najran, from any other sect of the national composition. They are one thing, and saboteurs and terrorists are something else. Likewise, terrorist elements of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia are one thing, whereas the normal Saudi citizen is something else. Terrorists are not affiliated to any community.
Iran is still mobilizing its agents whenever it senses an opportunity, and whenever it wants, whether in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria or Yemen, or in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. These agents must be aware of what is happening today, in light of mounting international pressure against Iran and the economic sanctions imposed upon it, with Iranian oil now becoming an issue faster than anticipated. We could soon see the Iranian raincloud of escalation erupting, with the threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz. Habibollah Sayyari, an Iranian Navy commander, said a few days ago that closing the Strait would be “easier than drinking a glass of water”.
In reality, it is not likely that Iran will close the Strait of Hormuz. It is too weak to prevent the supply of oil from the Gulf to the wider world, but through its military exercises, which are always being described as bigger and more expansive; it is trying to send a message to everyone concerned.
The best thing now for certain Saudi Shiites, whether opponents or supporters, politicians or developers, is to remain affiliated to their homeland and stay away from Iran. Iran only seeks to exploit them and employ them for its interests, but it is indifferent to their eventual fate.
The purpose of this article is to remind ourselves that Iranian subversion directed against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf is a genuine threat, as evidenced by past events, and confirmed by history. It is not in the interests of anyone to disregard the facts of history, under any slogan.